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High reliability organising (HRO) and resilience engineering (RE) have emerged 
as key concepts in safety management which promise a move away from 
bureaucracy and a means to manage safety without sacrificing performance. 
However, attempts to apply these ideas outside the ultra-safe sectors within 
which they developed have so far been limited. This paper uses the construction 
industry as a test case to explore the applicability of HRO and RE in a less highly 
regulated context. Through this discussion the research gaps are highlighted 
which have prevented the expansion of these new approaches into new sectors. 
The project-based nature, transient workforce, widespread outsourcing of labour 
and financial pressure of the construction sector limit opportunities for 
investment in employees and learning from experience; hence, developing 
principles advocated by HRO and RE such as management commitment, 
sensitivity to the frontline, prioritisation of safety, empowerment of employees, 
and a just culture presents a significant challenge. In spite of these barriers, there 
are also opportunities to be considered for construction to incorporate aspects of 
HRO and RE at an employee-centred level rather than organisational: Aspects of 
mindfulness and imagination; RE’s progressive understanding of accidents; and 
its holistic approach to cultivating resilience. It is argued that these opportunities 
offer a useful perspective for reframing safety debates in construction. The paper 
concludes with a research agenda which puts forward the need to extend and 
adapt aspects of HRO and RE in order to tackle some of the key characteristics of 
construction, namely subcontractor networks and temporary projects.  
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1. Introduction 
In the UK, 31% of all fatal occupational injuries were from the construction sector (HSE, 
2014), significantly above the average for all industries. The same is also true in the US 
where 18.9% (NIOSH, 2011) and Australia where 13.6% (SWA, 2015) of occupational 
fatalities occurred in construction. There is a pressing need to challenge the widespread 
perception that that risk is an inherent part of construction work and safety management is a 
“bureaucratic burden” that detracts from production (Swuste et al., 2012, p. 1333). So-called 
“safety inflation” (p.251) has resulted in cynicism. Occupational safety and health (OSH) has 
become about protecting vested interests, shirking responsibility, enhancing company image, 
and reducing common sense (Brown and Hanlon, 2014). It has become an increasingly 
bureaucratic exercise (Dekker, 2014) as organisations find security in copious, complicated 
documentation instead of valid risk analysis (so called ‘paper safety’ - Haddon-Cave, 2009).  
Borys et al.'s (2009) adaptive age of safety incorporates emerging fields of high reliability 
organising (HRO) and resilience engineering (RE) which represent a significant change in the 
way safety is addressed. They embrace the notion that, although many accidents are 
attributed to human error, the human capability for adaptation is also the element of a system 
which enables it to sustain reliable performance in light of adversity. HRO and RE may have 
developed in different fields, but both have arisen in response to the growing complexity of 
systems and the limitations of safety management systems (SMS) to protect the workforce. 
This age promises a move away from bureaucracy and regulation in safety; an understanding 
of accidents that does not rely on a root cause; and a way to manage the conflict between 
productivity and safety – all of which hinder OSH management in construction. Construction 
is a particularly unique industry: It has been characterised as an organic (Lingard and 
Rowlinson, 2005), heterogeneous network of subcontractors who form temporary multiple 
organisations (TMOs) (Stringer, 1967) to produce often unique projects. 
It might be assumed that new approaches which promise to reduce paperwork and regulation 
would be welcomed within construction, however, the sector has remained largely untouched 
by RE or HRO, and little is known about generalising these theories outside the safety-critical 
sectors in which they developed (HSE, 2011). Contrasting construction with the 
environments in which HRO and RE have previously been studied (organisations with 
permanent, stable structures and a clear purpose) provides an interesting lens through which 
to explore their potential and how these theories would need to be adapted to fit another 
context.  
Accordingly, this review evaluates the extent to which these theories are compatible with the 
construction sector in a discursive essay, contrasting the characteristics of construction with 
the principles of HRO and RE. Section 2 introduces HRO and RE, looks at why and how they 
arose, where they fit within the existing landscape of safety research, and the gaps in 
construction safety which these new approaches could provide fresh insight into. Section 3 
uses construction as a test case to explore the challenges of implementing HRO and RE and 
identify opportunities where elements of these concepts – their approach to risk management 
(Section 3.1), organisational principles (Section 3.2), and employee-centred principles 
(Section 3.3) – could be applied or adapted to improve safety in this sector. In doing so it puts 
forward the impediments to the adaptive age taking hold in other high-risk, but not 
necessarily safety-critical, sectors.  
2. Safety in the Adaptive Age and in Construction    
The differences between HRO and RE are subtle and there is an ongoing discourse as to 
whether the more recent of the two (RE) is simply a rebranding of the more established 
school of HRO. This section explores the origins of HRO and RE, unpacking their different 
philosophies and metrics, alongside the current state of safety research in construction to 
show how these nascent fields have diverged from traditional OSH.  
Since the introduction of the health and safety at work act (HSW) (SI 1974/1439), the past 40 
years have seen devolution of OSH – shifting responsibility from the government’s factory 
acts, to organisational SMS, to teams within organisations. Safety has been described as 
progressing through a series of ages, each distinguished by its emphasis on different aspects 
of the system. There are multiple accounts of these ages: Hale and Hovden (1998) proposed a 
technical age, human factors (HF) age, and management systems age; while Reason (1997) 
the person, engineering, and organisational safety models; and Hudson (2007) waves of 
technology, systems, and culture.  
Most recently, the adaptive age (Borys et al., 2009) has seen principles HRO and RE emerge 
within OSH management. These five ages are illustrated alongside the associated safety 
approaches in the timeline in Figure 1.
 Figure 1 - A timeline illustrating the ages of safety based on Waterson et al.,(2015)
Although OSH has developed at different times in different industries, Reason (1997), Hale 
and Hovden (1998), and Hudson’s (2007) accounts are broadly in agreement that its focus 
has moved from the individual interactions between people and technology to a holistic 
systems approach. OSH management in construction has followed the same overall trend, but 
has arguably been slower than other sectors in being shaped by the paradigms of the adaptive 
age, and to some extent the systems and cultural ages too. The first academic studies in 
construction safety emerged as late as 1978, and focused on technical aspects – accident 
statistics, causes, and costs. From 2002 research diversified to explore individual factors such 
as behaviour, competence and attitude, and most recently organisational characteristics, 
relationships, and culture (Zhou et al., 2015).  
Some studies have demonstrated the value of a systemic approach in construction. 
Organisational factors have been shown to reduce unsafe behaviours more than proximal 
factors such as site condition, materials, equipment and individual characteristics (Haslam et 
al., 2005; Khosravi and Bastani, 2014). However, in terms of successful interventions to 
prevent fatal injuries in construction sites, a recent review (van der Molen et al., 2012) 
concluded that regulation, training, inspections, and occupational health services are 
ineffective. Safety culture has also struggled to establish itself as a research topic in 
construction, emerging later than in other industries and declining since 2008 (Zhou et al., 
2015). To move forward, the differences between construction and organisations where HRO 
and RE have been successfully applied need to be understood.  
2.1 Comparing the Origins of HRO and RE 
HRO developed in response to normal accident theory (NAT) (Perrow, 1984), demonstrating 
that it is possible for some organisations to avoid ‘inevitable’ accidents. By observing 
organisations which operate successfully in “unforgiving environments” (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 164) (aircraft carriers, air traffic control, and a nuclear power plant) the 
qualities of organisational mindfulness, which enable these systems to cope, were identified. 
Case studies have shown that high reliability organisations are characterised by their capacity 
to respond, learn, and feedback quickly through accurate communications, and their 
flexibility to improvise by recombining resources, skills and experience (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007). These traits demonstrate the presence of organisational mindfulness – “a rich 
awareness of discriminatory detail and a capacity for action” (Weick et al., 2008, p. 37) – 
which enables HROs to notice the unexpected developing, contain it, or act resiliently in the 
face of it. Theoretically, HROs respond to perturbations in ways that strengthen adaptability – 
increasing learning, flexibility, experience – rather than reducing it by adding further controls 
(Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003). 
One core principle of HRO is a ‘commitment to resilience’, a term which has recently 
appeared with increasing frequency in a variety of contexts - ecological, individual and 
engineering (Bhamra et al., 2011). Engineering resilience in relation to safety grew out of 
‘organisational resilience', a term which first appeared in Mallack (1998) and Horne and Orr 
(1998) who described the ability of an organisation to respond to change constructively, 
without introducing regression. RE has been described as the natural next step in OSH 
following a highly developed ‘interdependent’ (DuPont, 2015) or ‘generative’ (Westrum, 
1991) safety culture, “to overcome the limitations of existing approaches” P.11 (Woods and 
Hollnagel, 2006). Its new perspective – seeing human adaptability as an asset - has been 
described as a significant step change (Hollnagel, 2008); however, it can also be seen as a 
continuation of the work of HF researchers to design systems around human attributes 
(Wilson, 2014). This emerging field has yet to develop a clear definition of its theory and 
limits making it difficult to draw comparisons with the clear framework of HRO. As such, 
Figure 1 shows RE overlapping several other safety approaches, representing that, although it 
represents change in philosophy. the field has yet to develop its own methods that can 
‘engineer’ resilience.   
2.2 Comparing the Conceptual Underpinnings of HRO and RE  
In spite of their different origins, there are similarities between HRO and RE. Both emerged 
in response to the limitations of procedures and regulation to manage safety in complex 
systems, and both emphasise the human attributes – adaptability, imagination, mindfulness – 
which enable people act resiliently and perform in circumstances where failure is expected. 
However, attempts to reconcile HRO with other high-risk safety approaches under the 
umbrella of ‘resilience engineering’ (Hollnagel et al., 2006) have had limited success because 
of their different philosophical foundations. 
One explanation for this disparity is their differing perspectives on what constitutes 
organisational resilience. In HRO’s model of organisational mindfulness, ‘commitment to 
resilience’ is categorised as a principle of containment, not anticipation. ‘Firefighting’ 
(reacting to emergencies as they arise) in high reliability organisations is seen as a positive 
trait and evidence of resilience (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) – something which, in other 
organisations, is seen as a symptom of poor planning and reactive management. Resilience 
engineers do refer to the work of HRO-scholars (Hollnagel, 2014), incorporating 
organisational mindfulness, whether or not this is true to Weick’s original concept, as one 
part of RE’s toolset of safety measures which can “facilitate the emergence of resilience” 
(Hollnagel and Sundstrӧm, 2006). Within RE resilience forms part of both anticipation and 
response – intrinsically linked as organisations adjust “prior to, during, or following changes” 
P.13 (Hollnagel and Fujita, 2013), whilst in HRO resilience is seen as the reaction to an 
incident, with a greater emphasis on ‘bouncing back’.  
2.3 Comparing Validation and Measurement in HRO and RE 
In terms of auditing resilience and HRO, measurement scales for HRO have been developed 
(Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007), but a literature review by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 
2011) criticised the lack of quantitative evidence supporting the predictive validity of 
organising in this way and safety performance. The majority of research was said to be 
observational and qualitative, providing rich descriptions of the qualities of these 
organisations, but lacking a theoretical framework to justify why HROs succeed where other 
organisations fail.  
Similarly for RE, research is needed in terms of real-world empirical methods to validate its 
constructs (Burnard and Bhamra, 2011; Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003), especially as these are 
still developing. Hollnagel and Woods (2006) state that resilience cannot be measured, only 
an organisation’s capacity for it through variables such as buffering capacity, the flexibility of 
its structure, awareness of proximity to margins, and tolerances enabling graceful degradation 
(Woods, 2006). The characteristics of a resilient organisation are less well-defined than high 
reliability organisations, but the RE community believes any organisation can become 
resilient, with different industries managing stability and flexibility in different ways 
(McDonald, 2006). Therefore, RE could offer valuable opportunities to expand the well-
intentioned ideas of HRO to suit other contexts, but as yet further work is needed to 
understand the factors that facilitate the development of both resilience and mindfulness.  
3. Contrasting HRO and RE within Construction 
The following sections will compare concepts of HRO and RE through the lens of the 
construction industry and focus on three themes: Their approach to risk management, 
characteristics of the organisation, and employees which contribute to resilience and high-
reliability. Each theme will be discussed first in relation to the differences between these 
adaptive age approaches and construction OSH which present barriers to their 
implementation, followed by the opportunities where their concepts could be valuable.   
3.1 Risk Management  
 Barriers 
Applicability to construction 
One of the greatest barriers to adopting HRO in new sectors is the belief that HRO is only 
applicable in safety critical industries. In construction, workers believe that “safety detracts 
from the primary production process” (Swuste et al., 2012, p. 1333). This is true in some 
sectors such as rail, where unforeseen hazards frequently lead to delays or cancelations (Hale 
and Heijer, 2006a); however, both RE and HRO emphasise maintaining performance and 
safety simultaneously - the key to safe performance without sacrificing reliability is resilience. 
Reason’s Organisational safety model deliberately blurs the line between quality and safety, 
as safe operation is an integral part of performance as a whole (Reason, 1997). This is 
particularly true in the safety-critical industries where HRO developed. The synonymous use 
of “safe” and “reliable” implies high-reliability is only attainable by organisations where 
safety is the primary focus – a view which underlies the conceptual barrier to applying this 
theory elsewhere and one which has kept HRO from integrating into construction (olde 
Scholtenhuis and Dorée, 2014). However, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) intend their work as a 
template for “any institution that wants to better organise for high reliability”.  
Neither HRO nor RE promise zero accidents, but rather a reduced probability in terms of the 
number of encounters. In circumstances where the risks are high, it is possible for an 
organisation to be described as resilient even if it has accidents (Hollnagel, 2014). Similarly, 
if the risks are low, an organisation may be safe without needing to be resilient (Hale and 
Heijer, 2006b). The high number and type of accidents faced by construction compared to 
ultra-safe organisations may explain one of the differences that prevent HRO and RE being 
applied more widely. Although construction is high-risk, the concern here is the high level of 
personal injury incidents, whereas HRO and RE have developed in safety-critical sectors - 
such as nuclear and aviation – with the potential to cause harm to third parties (Reason, 1997). 
The prevalent causes of death in construction are falls from a height (30%), slips, trips and 
falls on the level, being struck by a moving vehicle (Haslam et al., 2005) and electrocution 
(HSE, 2014).  
Accidents therefore become intolerable on account of their consequences rather 
than their frequency…100 isolated, singular deaths may have far less emotional 
impact than 10 deaths in a single event. (Amalberti, 2006, p. 269)  
The social amplification of risk framework (SARF) describes how some risks are amplified 
by social, psychological, and cultural factors (Kasperson et al., 1988). Although the majority 
of occupational fatalities occur due to construction accidents, they are “isolated” events, so 
the risk is socially “attenuated” and research has been diverted to focus on sectors with 
greater risk of harm to the public and which generate more political and media interest. 
However, construction is not immune to causing collateral deaths: Last year, 4 passers-by 
died in UK construction accidents (HSE, 2014) and the collapse of the Rana Plaza textile 
factory in Savar, Bangladesh in 2013 killed 1,134 people (The Guardian, 2015). Reason 
(1997) argues risks to third parties are high across all sectors because, despite differences at 
the frontline, they are equally threatened by latent problems of planning, scheduling, and 
budgeting which contribute to major accidents. For HRO and RE to benefit construction, the 
similarities between accidents in safety critical sectors and those in construction need to be 
embraced.   
 Opportunities  
Accident Causation 
Before the age of systems safety, accidents were believed to have a root cause - a technical 
malfunction or individual failure on which events could be blamed. This simplistic model is 
emotionally satisfying and has legal and financial benefits (Reason, 1997), but can fail to 
appreciate the complex relationships between causes and consequences. Within construction 
this tendency towards simplifying situations to find a root cause can be seen in contemporary 
accidents (Clegg and Kreiner, 2014). The prominence of the ‘Zero Accidents’ discourse also 
confirms this model. Using propaganda to manipulate workers’ attitude to safety 
demonstrates the belief that accidents could be prevented with more effort or care (Dekker, 
2015). Swuste et al. (2012) argue a better understanding of causal chains is needed to 
improve construction safety; however, given the loosely coupled structure of construction 
organisations, it can be difficult to identify and learn from causal links and to accept a lack of 
accidents as proof of good practice (Clegg and Kreiner, 2014).  
Accidents in HRO are described in causal terms, as the result of an unfortunate combination 
of a number of errors; hence, detecting failures as they develop through sensitivity to weak 
signals is advocated (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). However, this simplistic understanding of 
accidents has been criticised for endorsing the idea that accidents can be prevented by paying 
more ‘mindful’ attention to precursor events (HSE, 2011). Based on this interpretation, risk 
analysis depends upon the systematic identification of causal chains and implies safety is a 
static commodity that can be quantified, not a dynamic process. Projects, like those in 
construction, have been described as “drifting environments” (Kreiner, 1996, p. 335), where 
the outcome changes over time, thus RE’s notion of drifting accidents offers a different 
perspective on accidents investigation (Hollnagel, 2009) which could be better suited to 
loosely coupled systems than exploring causal chains and looking for pivotal failures. For RE, 
safety is a dynamic process, human behaviour cannot be categorised in a bimodal way and 
the causes of accidents are far more subtle and complex - nothing worth reporting happens 
(Hollnagel, 2009). Instead, accidents are caused by an undetectable “drift into failure” (Hale 
and Heijer, 2006a, p. 37) which is a natural part of operations in resource-constrained 
environments.  
RE scholars argue a causal model cannot cope with complex relationships (Hollnagel, 2009) 
and unexpected failures (Hollnagel, 2014) - only predictable cases where data can be reliably 
assessed - and is hindered by a form of confirmation bias Hollnagel calls ‘What-You-Look-
For-Is-What-You-Find’ (WYLFIWYF) (Hollnagel, 2009). The efficiency thoroughness trade 
off (ETTO) principle (the tendency to sacrifice thoroughness for efficiency) is key to 
understanding the ‘drift’ that means failure can develop out of normal behaviour. Humans 
have a natural tendency towards efficiency (Hollnagel, 2009). Rational decision-making is 
also limited by context, subject to social and cultural factors (Perrow, 1984), and constrained 
by finite cognitive resources so people “muddle through” making what they perceive to be 
“sensible adjustments to cope with current and future situational demands” P.149 (Hollnagel, 
2014). In many cases, this performance variability is a positive improvement, enabling more 
efficient ways of working, but the same variability can also lead to failures (Hollnagel, 2009).  
RE incorporates the ETTO into its understanding of accident causation, recognising that 
people instinctively make sacrificing decisions, or trade-offs, to cope with pressure; 
thoroughness is sacrificed for efficiency, safety is sacrificed for production. Instead, it is 
proposed that accidents are caused by functional resonance – an unexpected combination of 
everyday performance variability, or “ETTOing”, the consequences of which are emergent 
rather than resultant (Hollnagel, 2009).  
Reanalysing construction accidents through the lens of RE’s functional resonance could 
provide a different perspective. Although trading off safety for production can lead to 
accidents, understanding that the workforce’s natural adaptability has the potential to 
strengthen the system, as well as weaken it, highlights the opportunity to harness for the 
benefit of safety. These theories of drift within performance and its effects, which can 
reverberate unpredictably throughout a system, present an interesting challenge to 
construction and HRO’s interpretation of accidents. Both these fields subscribe to the notion 
that accidents can be predicted and therefore prevented by promoting greater attention - or the 
vision of “zero accidents” in construction. However, according to RE, it is the efficient 
decisions which prevent accidents and maintain performance every day, as well as cause 
them when performance drifts outside the acceptable tolerance. 
Anticipating Accidents 
Accidents in high reliability organisations are, by definition, extremely rare. They operate in 
environments which preclude learning by experimentation because of the dangers they face; 
therefore, little is said about how they learn from accidents. Instead, mindfulness encourages 
a focus on the present because – although past experience can be valuable – memory can 
draw attention away from current events and provoke generalised interpretations based on 
hindsight. This reactive approach to learning from accidents (or precursors of accidents), 
where feedback is immediately acted upon, could be beneficial in an industry like 
construction where factors needed for long-term learning – leadership, processes, 
infrastructure, communication, education and community  (Chinowsky et al., 2007) - are 
hindered by the dynamic and fragmented nature of TMOs.  
HRO’s principle of ‘preoccupation with failure’ encourages members of the organisation to 
imagine potential mistakes, elaborate on near misses, and articulate the consequences – 
however distressing – so mitigations can be expanded (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). Similarly, 
RE advocates the use of ‘Second Stories’ – looking for other potential outcomes of the events 
to avoid bias, hindsight, and oversimplification caused by knowing the real outcome 
(Hollnagel, 2014). It also warns of the dangers of “distancing through differencing” or the “it 
would never happen to us” attitude (Cook and Woods, 2006) meaning people fail to see the 
similarities between accidents in other organisations and events in their own, and therefore 
cannot learn from them. Both these theories have potential to enhance safety in construction. 
Recently RE has put forward an approach to safety management known as “safety-II”. 
Traditionally, safety (“safety-I”) has focussed on what went wrong following an accident; but 
under safety-II, a greater emphasis on the aspects that contribute to normal performance is 
encouraged; in order to learn from events they need to be frequent enough to make 
generalisations. In complete contrast with HRO, which advocates seeing the unique nuances 
of every event (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007), RE accepts that accidents are difficult to learn 
from because they are rare, poorly understood, and difficult to make generalisations about. 
Instead, investigating everyday successes – such as human adaptability and positive 
performance variability – can be seen as an investment in performance rather than safety 
(Hollnagel, 2014).  
Accident research in construction, as well as many other sectors, is hindered by a mistaken 
belief that “the potential for learning is proportional to the severity of the incident” 
(Hollnagel, 2014, p. 160). Hence, accident investigation is often confined to serious and fatal 
accidents (Hinze et al., 2006). Although it would be difficult to justify a shift in focus away 
from accidents (as advocated in safety-II) when they are a frequent occurrence, understanding 
accidents as emergent consequences of adaptations required to cope with pressure could 
reduce the propensity for blame, creating a just culture as advocated by both HRO and RE, 
and open up opportunities to embrace workers’ flexibility - seeing it as a form of resilience as 
opposed to disobedience. 
Key differences between HRO and RE have been identified in their approach to risk 
management and their applicability to other contexts. Underpinning these differences is their 
understanding of the way in which accidents develop. HRO, like construction, takes a view 
that accidents are the result of a causal chain of errors, thus the precursors to accidents can be 
detected by paying mindful attention to cues in the present. RE is founded on the belief that 
accidents emerge from adaptations made to cope with pressure and the “drift” towards failure 
is unnoticeable. This disparity is reflected in the ways the two schools advocate anticipating 
accidents.  
Table 1 lists the new concepts for risk management from the adaptive age, whether they arose 
from HRO or RE, and summarises the positive and negative points from the evaluation of 
their potential application in construction. 
 Table 1 - Summary of barriers and opportunities for applying adaptive risk management characteristics in construction 
Risk management principle From HRO or RE 
Barriers to application in 
construction 
Opportunities for application in 
construction 
Applicable to safety-critical industries where 
accidents are rare but catastrophic. 
HRO 
Risks in construction are socially attenuated by 
high frequency and low fatalities-per-accident.   
Understand failures as the undetectable 
consequence of ‘functional resonance’ 
(performance variability). 
RE 
The zero accident discourse and a culture of 
blame are prominent in construction, so 
constructs that challenge this are unlikely to be 
accepted. 
Could be better suited to a loosely coupled 
industry where causal chains are difficult to 
identify.  
Could counteract confirmation bias and 
propensity for blame when analysing accidents.  
Accidents can be predicted and prevented by 
paying greater attention to precursors.  
HRO 
Causal chains are difficult to identify in loosely 
coupled systems.  
Implies workers are lazy, negligent, or careless. 
Could build upon ‘zero accidents’ which is 
popular in construction.      
Focus on everyday performance. RE 
Difficult to justify when accidents are a 
frequent occurrence. 
Could promote sensitivity to operations. 
Could enable investment in performance and 
strengthening the positive aspects of a system, 
rather than preventive methods. 
Focus on the present when responding to 
unexpected events. 
HRO  
Could reduce the requirement for long-term 
learning in a temporary organisation. 
 
3.2 Organisational Principles  
 Barriers  
Applicability to construction 
As with its theories about risk management, HRO’s ideas about organisations have also 
meant it has not been readily embraced by construction. The type of organisation HRO is 
based upon is fundamentally different from construction work. NAT (Perrow, 1984) arranges 
organisations onto two axes, forming 4 quadrants, according to their characteristics. 
“Coupling” (originally an engineering term) describes the capacity to absorb shocks and 
failures. If an organisation is tightly coupled its processes are time-dependent, sequential and 
invariable - leaving little slack - so perturbations have a rapid impact. “Complexity” describes 
the interactions between components. In linear systems it is easier to substitute people and 
materials because roles are less specialised, information is directly monitored, feedback is 
local, and control can be decentralised. In complex systems the interactions may be invisible, 
unpredictable, indirectly measured, and connect multiple subsystems; therefore, perturbations 
have a widespread impact.  
In organisations which are both tightly coupled and complex failures have a rapid and 
widespread impact. HRO describes the characteristics needed for safe performance in this 
type of organisation. According to the NAT framework, construction is low risk because raw 
materials are assembled, rather than fabricated, and their processes are visible and can be 
understood; thus there are opportunities to learn from construction accidents. However, the 
growing popularity of megaprojects as a delivery model for public services (Flyvbjerg, 2014) 
means managers must coordinate numerous subcontractor organisations, work to a tight 
schedule, and keep agreements with local stakeholders to minimise disruption. For example, 
details such as the sequence in which deliveries have been loaded onto a lorry can mean a 
delay of a few hours but have widespread repercussions over several months for multiple 
other contractors who cannot begin their work until prerequisite stages have been built 
(Walsh, 2015). Although the industry as a whole is loosely coupled, projects and their supply 
chains have become increasingly tightly coupled and complex – a structure which Dubois and 
Gadde (2002) describe as a two-layered pattern of coupling. In light of the recent changes to 
the industry, the applicability of HRO’s principles in construction needs further consideration.  
Structure   
Under normal conditions high reliability organisations have an extremely hierarchical 
structure with clear roles and responsibilities; redundancy; high levels of accountability, and 
expectations for following procedures and performance (Roberts and Rousseau, 1989). The 
paradox of achieving high reliability is creating a strong hierarchy which can be dissolved 
rapidly in the face of adversity, allowing its empowered employees to manage local events. 
This transformation from centralised to decentralised control is only possible if organisations 
initially have a centralised control hierarchy (Glendon et al., 2006). The importance of 
management has been well established in safety as a whole (Zohar, 2010). Particularly within 
RE, the management’s ability to diagnose potential problems, make-decisions, and act 
assertively, underpinned by their commitment (Flin, 2006) and individual resilience 
(Hollnagel, 2009) are all believed to contribute to resilient leadership among managers. In 
construction projects however, lines of authority and accountability become unclear due to 
the dynamic, transient nature of TMOs. 
Culture  
Developing adaptability through cultural change is an idea which has appeared in both HRO 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) and RE (Reason, 2000; Wrethall, 2006). A just or reporting 
culture (Reason, 1997) is required for ‘sensitivity to operations’ or understanding work as 
performed, not as imagined (Hollnagel and Woods, 2006; Wrethall, 2006). Construction, like 
many organisations, can be seen to take front line operations for granted. A recent inquiry 
exposed the practice of blacklisting construction workers for being vocal about OSH issues 
(House of Commons, 2015). It is an industry highly vulnerable to economic pressure, 
employment fluctuates with recession and growth, hence the use of contracting to provide 
flexibility of labour and meet changing market demands (Manu et al., 2013). It has been 
suggested that, because HRO developed in non-profit organisations where safety is a primary 
objective, its constructs would be difficult to implement in sectors, like construction, with 
conflicting goals and pressures (Tamuz and Harrison, 2006). A resilient response relies on 
contingency resources and experience within the workforce – a challenge in “stretched 
systems” (Hollnagel and Woods, 2006) when employees are viewed as a disposable 
commodity.  
Procedures 
Although HRO classifies resilience as a principle of containment, it is recognised that a 
resilient response depends upon the “structures that have been developed before crisis arrives” 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). Similarly in RE, maintaining control in the face of unexpected 
events depends upon both anticipation and response (Hollnagel and Fujita, 2013). In spite of 
this, both HRO and RE are sceptical of formal planning: The limitations of foresight mean 
planning can never anticipate all the ways a system could fail. Planning can reduce the 
capacity for a resilient response because it imposes expectations on situations, promotes 
confirmation bias, and reduces improvisation (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). RE also warns that 
an overemphasis on procedures could lead to “work-to-rule” where workers follow 
regulations so strictly it negatively impacts upon productivity and safety (Hollnagel, 2009).  
Despite its limitations, RE recognises that in some cases proceduralisation may be the most 
appropriate safety mechanism (Amalberti, 2006). Perrow (1967) argues the degree to which 
organisational activity can be “pre-programmed” depends upon the activity itself. According 
to his framework, construction is classified as an industry well suited to procedures because 
its tasks are well structured and routine, exceptional cases are rare, and solutions to problems 
are easy to find. Thus, reducing proceduralisation is a concept from the adaptive age that 
should be applied with caution in construction. Avoiding planning may encourage resilience 
to develop in some organisations, but in others it could reduce anticipation and lead to 
reactive management (McDonald, 2006).  
HRO recommends preparing for failure by building in contingency in the form of 
uncommitted resources or “pockets of resilience” P.80 (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). Rather 
than procedures or protocols, high reliability organisations plan by investing in systems that 
gracefully degrade and developing a broad range of employee experience; shared knowledge 
within the system; and training and drills to support ‘deference to expertise’. In an industry 
like construction which is loosely regulated (Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005) and averse to 
rules (Swuste et al., 2012), formal contingency plans are difficult to establish. The notion of 
uncommitted resources to help manage unexpected events is attractive, but unlikely in such a 
resource constrained environment.  
 Opportunities 
Cultivating Resilience 
HRO’s model of organisational mindfulness presents a ‘one-size-fits-all’ template which does 
not suit a fragmented, organic, transient organisation. However, RE recognises that 
“spontaneous resilience” (Amalberti, 2006, p. 271) can be found in unsafe systems; hence, its 
stance is a more inclusive and holistic one. Resilience is seen as an emergent property so a 
top-down approach – forcing systems to adopt structures seen in successful organisations - 
shows an idealised understanding (Amalberti, 2006). A specific strategy for developing 
resilience is not prescribed; instead, RE methods should depend on the context and stage of 
development (McDonald, 2006).  
RE relies on organisations learning from experience how best to facilitate resilience in their 
own operations. Resilience is expressed differently in each system and at each stage, so to 
develop it requires an ongoing commitment to identify and invest in the factors that 
contribute. In other words, resilience is a proactive process a system does, rather than - as 
HRO suggests - a reactive mechanism a system has (Woods and Hollnagel, 2006). This offers 
a more hopeful perspective, opening up the possibility of developing resilience in any 
organisation, providing the approach is suitable. The existing resilience within construction 
workers can be expanded to apply to safety, as well as production, without needing to adopt 
the structures of HROs; However, developing a strategy for cultivating resilience in a TMO - 
where feedback loops are not well defined and learning from experience difficult - is an area 
in need of further research. 
At an organisational level, the services within which HRO and RE have so far been studied 
shed little light on how adaptive safety might apply in a temporary project. Hierarchy, 
commitment to the workforce, reduced proceduralisation, and an unchallenged commitment 
of resources to safety are all concepts which do not transfer well into construction. However, 
it may be possible for construction to draw upon RE as its methods for ‘engineering’ 
resilience are not confined to a prescribed template and there is scope to develop a strand of 
RE specific to construction. Table 2 lists the organisational concepts for from the adaptive 
age, whether they arose from HRO or RE, and summarises the positive and negative points 
from the evaluation of their potential application in construction. 
Table 2 - Summary of barriers and opportunities for applying adaptive organisational principles in construction 
Organisational principle From HRO or RE 
Barriers to application in 
construction 
Opportunities for application in 
construction 
Applicable to complex and tightly coupled 
systems. 
HRO 
According to NAT’s framework, construction 
is not seen as a high-risk industry despite the 
recent growth in complex projects. 
Today’s construction projects, which are far 
more complex and tightly coupled, indicate an 
opportunity to reconceptualise ‘high-risk’ 
industries. 
Control is simultaneously centralised and 
decentralised. 
HRO 
Local-decision making and independence are 
encouraged. 
Construction is loosely regulated. 
Multiple subcontractors mean lines of authority 
and accountability are unclear.   
Just culture HRO and RE 
Emphasis on zero accidents and identifying a 
root cause of accidents. 
Workers rarely report accidents and have been 
blacklisted for being vocal about OSH issues.  
Highlights the need to focus research on 
developing a just culture in construction. 
Prioritise and invest in safety HRO and RE 
Resources are constrained due to economic 
pressure. 
Production is prioritised over safety.  
 
Avoid formal plans, and instead develop 
uncommitted contingency resources 
HRO 
Proceduralisation is widespread in construction 
due to the misconception that tasks are routine. 
Transfer of experience is limited between 
temporary projects. 
Resources are constrained due to economic 
pressure.  
Management commitment to the frontline HRO and RE 
Production tends to be prioritised over safety. 
Lines of authority and accountability are 
unclear. 
 
Cultivate resilience in a way appropriate to 
each context and stage 
RE 
Further research is required to understand what 
this looks like in organic TMOs. 
Could open up the potential to develop 
resilience in a new and different context. 
3.3 Employee-centred Principles 
 Barriers 
Empowerment 
At an individual level there are opportunities for employees to develop a resilient mind set 
which could allow construction to adopt adaptive safety in spite of the barriers at the 
organisational and risk management strategy levels. However, a significant discrepancy still 
exists with respect to their stance on empowerment. The challenge for tightly coupled and 
complexly interactive systems is the need for control to be simultaneously centralised – to see 
the interactions between different parts of the system –  and decentralised – so operators can 
act quickly and independently (Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1997). Both HRO and RE advocate 
empowering individuals to respond to unexpected events, but decentralised decision-making 
applied in a context like construction - where safety is not prioritised, regulation loose, and 
lines of authority unclear - leads to workarounds, and unsafe acts.  
Herzberg (1987) found that performance could be improved if employees had greater 
autonomy, direct feedback, and an understanding of the significance and identity of their task 
– unlike the fragmented tasks of scientific management (Taylor, 1911). To some extent this is 
similar to the principle of ‘deference to expertise’ in HRO (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) - 
allowing leadership to migrate to the people with the most expertise, regardless of their rank 
or experience and RE which describes resilient organisations as “empowered to be 
independent, involved, informed, and informative” P.324 (Hollnagel and Woods, 2006). 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) say empowerment can be achieved by encouraging constant 
interaction between teams. Multi-disciplinary teams increase trust, prevent power struggles, 
and are better at coping because existing skills and knowledge can be recombined to deal 
with unique situations. They have greater diversity in their experiences - which can also be 
achieved through selection, job rotation, retraining - to increase awareness of the operational 
picture and prevent complacency. However, this is difficult in construction because the 
majority of work is subcontracted, allowing firms to employ specialists on a flexible basis. As 
a result, the organisation becomes fragmented into units with conflicting interests, ambiguous 
responsibilities, inadequate communication, and reduced teamwork (Manu et al., 2013).  
An empowered workforce relies on communication, knowledge management, and 
opportunities for long-term investment and training, all of which are compromised in 
construction. To achieve the multi-skilled, self-managed teams seen in HROs, construction 
workers would need to be better educated and have higher expectations for job enrichment 
(Price et al., 2004). The existing literature on empowerment focuses on internal teams, and 
there is a lack of guidance as to how these could apply to outsource providers, highlighting a 
barrier to applying HRO to construction. For a TMO to empower employees in this way may 
not be possible, given that workers are employed for their specific skills, but it stresses the 
need to foster relationships between contractor organisations to create a community of 
practice with a better understanding of the “big picture”.  
 Opportunities 
Sensitive to the Unexpected 
Under the principle of ‘reluctance to simplify’, HROs encourage an understanding of error 
which sees the unique nuances of suspicious events to learn more rather than generalise about 
them. Their tendency towards efficiency means people are quick to name, categorise and 
stereotype phenomena; this helps to organise information and make it more sharable, but the 
use of rigid categories can mean its thorough exploration is brought to a premature end. 
Avoiding simple diagnoses based on superficial similarities affords HROs a clearer and more 
complete picture of situations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007).  
In intractable, high-risk environments it is impractical to be this thorough. Another concept 
proposed by Weick is that of “sensemaking”, describing how people cope with ambiguity by 
making sense of a situation through action and communication, and settle for a plausible 
explanation (Weick et al., 2012). This is similar to RE’s ETTO: Rather than counteracting the 
natural tendency to simplify, the ETTO accepts that it is impossible for people find thorough, 
rational explanations for every event. To cope in dynamic situations people have learned to 
trade off thoroughness for efficiency and identify all the relevant information without being 
overwhelmed, rather than “find the perfect response when it is too late.” (Hollnagel, 2009, p. 
55). HRO’s sensemaking and RE’s ETTO both describe the reality of coping with pressure in 
high-risk, ambiguous environments. Efficient or plausible explanations, rather than a 
complete understanding, can result in presumptuous decisions and lead to errors. Although it 
is impossible to avoid some simplification and routine, HRO’s warning that this should be 
done “slowly, reluctantly, mindfully” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 12) is nonetheless a 
valuable message and one that has not gone unrecognised in construction: Clegg and Kreiner 
(2014) suggest that one way to improve learning from construction accidents is to “make 
learning harder, not to facilitate it”. Where situations are complex and ambiguous, doubt and 
scepticism should be welcomed as they prevent complacency. 
Imagination to Anticipate  
To avoid accidents, employees of high reliability organisations consciously maintain failure 
at the forefront of their mindset – the principle of ‘preoccupation with failure’. HRO warns of 
the dangers of falling into automatic processing, and instead these organisations “persuade all 
their members to be chronically concerned about the unexpected” P.62 (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007, p. 62). Reporting is rewarded and a questioning attitude encouraged so employees 
remain sensitive to weak signals – acting on hunches that something might be going wrong. 
The same concept can be seen in RE, as Hollnagel and Woods (2006) also advocate a 
“constant sense of unease” P.355 and Dekker “keeping the discussion on safety alive even 
when everything looks safe” (2006). 
A similar concept has also been called “requisite imagination” (RI) (Adamski and Westrum, 
2003, p. 193), “safety imagination” (Pidgeon and O’Leary 2000), and “chronic unease” 
(Reason, 1997). RI - “the fine art of anticipating what might go wrong” (Adamski and 
Westrum, 2003, p. 193) - is essential for resilience (Hollnagel and Woods, 2006); It fuels a 
questioning attitude and enables designers to anticipate all the possible scenarios. Similarly, 
safety imagination (Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000) encourages a less rigid approach to 
anticipation in order to capture the failures outside expectations (Pidgeon, 2010). Finally, 
chronic unease was first described by Reason (1997) as “the assumption that every day will 
be a bad day” and has more recently been broken down into  five attributes – vigilance, 
pessimism, RI, flexible thinking, and the propensity to worry (Fruhen et al., 2013).  
Developing a culture of chronic concern about safety issues is a fundamental part of 
resilience and organisational mindfulness, and its potential to improve safety in construction 
has been recognised -“we need more theorising and imagination than facts and evidence” 
P.143 (Kreiner, 2009). Mentally simulating the potential ways the operations could fail 
expands the “complex tree of causalities” P.142 (Kreiner, 2009) therefore increasing the 
number of precautions to be taken. Imagination also extends the potential of learning from 
accidents using imagination to avoid what Cook and Woods (2006) called “distancing 
through differencing”, and prevents “overlearning” from single-events by mediating 
experiences with an awareness of their complexity, randomness and ambiguity. In a 
masculine industry (Aulich, 2013; Lindebaum and Fielden, 2010) where risk as an integral 
part of work (Swuste et al., 2012), encouraging vigilance and lowering risk tolerance in this 
way presents an interesting opportunity. However, other than raising awareness that bringing 
attention back onto task when distracted requires conscious effort (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007), neither RE or HRO offer any empirical insights into how this ‘preoccupation with 
failure’ can be established or measured.  
Initiative to respond 
Their ability to transform between centralised and decentralised control means HROs could 
be described as both ‘mechanistic’ and ‘organic’ (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Organic 
industries respond rapidly to changing market conditions, whereas mechanistic organisations, 
such as process industries, have a stable hierarchy. Construction is organic which provides 
one explanation for its poor safety record. OSH is far more difficult to implement in organic 
organisations than mechanistic because autonomy, responsibility, and the use of initiative to 
overcome problems are encouraged (Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005).  
In accordance with its philosophy that accidents can be detected as they develop, HRO 
encourages organisations to react to unexpected events with a contingency of uncommitted 
resources and diverse skills (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). Ironically, construction workers are 
adaptable – using initiative to work independently – but without clear lines of authority, 
regulation, and prioritisation of safety, the natural human tendency towards efficiency leads 
to unsafe workarounds and violations rather than resilient performance adaptations. This 
suggests high-reliability results from the combination of individual empowerment and 
hierarchical control. Therefore, for construction to be highly-reliable would require structural 
changes to improve regulation and management – an impossible challenge to implement 
given that construction projects are formed of multiple, temporary subcontractors (Stringer, 
1967). Imposing control and structure in this way is a major barrier to expanding HRO to 
other sectors, but cultivating workers’ “spontaneous resilience” and channelling this 
capability towards safety, rather than productivity, could provide a useful opportunity. In 
contexts like construction, with complex organisational networks and high pressure, worker-
innovated practices have been shown to be more influential than regulation; to improve safety 
the ways in which this knowledge exists and flows within the system need to be understood 
(Pink, et al. in press). 
The value of avoiding assumption, imagination, and initiative are all traits of adaptive safety 
which could be adopted within construction. It could be possible for construction employees 
to develop resilience even in an industry where the structure and financial constraints do not 
support resilience at an organisational level. A research agenda is presented in section 4 to 
outline how this could be achieved. Table 3 lists the employee-centred aspects of the adaptive 
age, whether they arose from HRO or RE, and summarises the positive and negative points 
from the evaluation of their potential application in construction. 
Table 3 - Summary of barriers and opportunities for applying adaptive employee principles in construction 
Employee principle From HRO or RE 
Barriers to application in 
construction 
Opportunities for application in 
construction 
Empowerment. HRO and RE 
Contract-based employment limits 
opportunities to invest in people.   
Construction workers are employed for their 
specialised skills. 
Levels of education are low. 
Expectations of job enrichment are low. 
 
Understand the "big picture". HRO 
Independent subcontractors work in silos. 
Communication is fragmented. 
Contractors are employed on a temporary basis. 
Could improve relationships between 
organisations to create a collective community 
of practice. 
Multi-disciplinary teams and diverse 
experience. 
HRO 
Construction workers are employed for their 
specialised skills. 
Contract-based employment limits 
opportunities for investment in people.   
 
Adaptability. HRO and RE 
According to HRO, centralised control is 
needed alongside adaptability, whereas 
construction is loosely regulated and lines of 
authority are unclear.  
Production is prioritised over safety, so 
adaptability is applied to meet targets rather 
than respond to unexpected events.  
 
Could harness construction workers’ natural 
adaptability. 
Could improve safety without sacrificing 
productivity. 
Could improve safety without introducing top-
down structures. 
 
Avoid simplification (Sensemaking and the 
ETTO). 
HRO and RE 
Productivity is prioritised so efficient decisions 
are encouraged. 
Could enhance vigilance. 
Could prevent the emphasis on 
efficiency/productivity overshadowing safety. 
Develop a culture of chronic unease. HRO and RE 
Workers rarely report accidents.  
In this masculine environment, risk is seen as 
an inherent part of construction work.  
Could lower risk tolerance of workers.  
Could heighten anticipation and response to 
unexpected events. 
Could increase investment in risk management. 
 
4. Research Agenda 
For construction to embrace adaptive safety, in light of this evaluation the following areas of 
research show the most promise and should be made the focus of further research in both 
construction safety and the adaptive age of safety.  
As many of the difficulties incorporating adaptive safety into construction hinge on 
construction’s unique nature as a fragmented and dynamic industry, there is a need to rethink 
how an understanding of the ‘big picture’ can be supported in a temporary project formed 
from a network of organisations. There are examples of high-profile construction 
megaprojects where systems integration has been successful (Davies, et al. 2009, Bolt, et al. 
2012) but this needs to become the norm across the industry in both large and small projects. 
Opportunities should be sought to learn from these successful megaprojects to create 
temporary yet well integrated project-based organisations as a basis for adaptive safety.  
This review has also brought to light new ways accidents in the construction industry could 
be reframed to change the way they are approached. Hollnagel’s (2009) theory of accidents 
as a result of drifting performance and functional resonance offers an alternative to the ‘root 
cause’ model which contributes to the culture of blame surrounding accidents. Models of drift 
could be well suited to temporary and dynamic construction organisations (Kreiner, 1995) 
and need further investigation in this context. Other ideas which could enhance and develop 
construction’s risk management strategy include increasing focus on responding to the 
present – thus reducing reliance on past experience, which can be inconsistent in a temporary 
organisation, to inform safety policy – and using a safety-II approach to increase investment 
in maintaining everyday performance as opposed to preventing accidents. 
Finally, the adaptive age’s theories about individuals’ capacity to anticipate and respond to 
risk present an opportunity for construction to change at an employee-centred level, reducing 
accidents without challenging the structure and nature of the industry. Construction workers’ 
have an ability to work around problems, a valuable asset to resilience if it can be ensured it 
is exercised for safety as well as productivity. There is potential for construction to adapt 
theories of safety imagination or chronic unease and find ways to develop these traits within 
workers and heighten vigilance.  
5. Conclusions 
This review presents a challenge for both construction OSH and the HRO and RE 
communities. Exploring the two side-by-side, has underlined the disconnect between OSH 
and systems safety, and the differences between HRO and RE. Further research is needed to 
understand how construction can reprioritise in order to adopt adaptive safety approaches, 
and how HRO and RE can be extended and adapted to suit a network of subcontractors and 
temporary projects. 
The Adaptive age requires management commitment, sensitivity to the frontline, 
prioritisation of safety, empowerment of employees, and a just culture; thus, it seems 
impossible to apply in an industry where contracting is ubiquitous, and investment in people 
is limited by the constrained budget and uniqueness of projects. These contrasts are 
summarised in Table 4. 
Table 4 - Summary of contrasts between the adaptive age and construction 
 Characteristics of the 
adaptive age  
Characteristics of construction 
Structure 
 
Tightly coupled and complex Loosely coupled 
Empowered, multi-disciplinary 
teams 
Sub-contractors paid per task 
Permanent organisations Transient projects 
Strong hierarchy of control 
(HRO only) 
Independent, local decision 
making 
Organisation 
Able to build in contingency 
resources 
Vulnerable to economic 
pressure 
Safety is prioritised 
Production targets are 
prioritised over safety 
Open to change Rejects innovation 
A just culture Low levels of reporting 
Accidents 
Accidents affect 3rd and 4th 
party victims 
Personal injury accidents 
Media attention 
Accidents rarely reported in the 
news 
Individuals 
Sensitive to failure Low risk perception 
Employees understand the “big 
picture” 
Employees work independently 
in silos 
 
Moreover, considering HRO and RE in isolation, there are further barriers to their application 
in construction. HRO uses multi-disciplinary teams to diversify skills and experience, while 
construction workers are employed for their highly-specialised skills and work in silos, and 
RE - despite being more open-minded about the approach - relies on experience to inform 
how an organisation invests in developing resilience, a long-term strategy difficult to 
implement in temporary projects.  
Table 5 summarises the principles of the adaptive age which offer the greatest opportunities 
for improving safety in construction, providing the barriers can be overcome. The novel 
approach to risk management and the employee-centred aspects of resilience show the most 
potential. 
Table 5 - Summary of opportunities for construction from the adaptive age 
Approach Origin Opportunity for construction 
Risk management 
RE 
Understand that failures emerge from performance 
adaptations to cope under pressure to reduce the 
propensity for blame.  
RE 
Focus on everyday performance to strengthen the system 
against accidents and reduce the propensity for blame. 
HRO 
Focus on the present when responding to the unexpected 
to reduce the requirement for long-term plans and 
learning from experience. 
Employee-centred 
HRO 
Enhance workers' understanding of the "big picture" to 
build relationships between subcontractors and prevent 
silo working. 
HRO and RE 
Encourage adaptability among the workforce to support a 
resilient response.  
HRO and RE 
Develop a culture of chronic unease among employees to 
lower their tolerance to risk. 
HRO and RE 
Avoid simplifying unexpected events to maintain a 
vigilant and sceptical attitude. 
Organisational RE 
Cultivate resilience in a way that is appropriate to the 
unique context of each organisation.  
 
At present, construction workers’ “spontaneous resilience” is channelled towards productivity 
rather than safety because their risk perception is low. Conventional safety measures may 
have had limited success because the safer an environment feels the more risks people are 
willing to make (Wilde, 1982), but developing ‘chronic unease’ or safety imagination could 
help lower tolerance to risks by contextualising others’ accidents, and imagining ways things 
could fail; this could encourage individuals to act resiliently without needing to adopt top-
down structures. As construction workers see risk as an integral part of their work (Swuste et 
al., 2012), intervening to lower their tolerance of risk presents a viable way to improve safety.  
The authors have focussed on construction as a domain for this research; however, the 
findings could be applicable to other hazardous but not safety-critical sectors such agriculture, 
fisheries, forestry and mining which share organisational characteristics with construction. 
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